· 9 min read
AES-GCM stops anyone from forging or altering your ciphertexts. It does not stop them from moving a valid one somewhere else. A concrete attack, the one parameter that fixes it, a test that keeps it fixed, and what is left to protect once it is.
· 12 min read
Part 3/4 - Separation of duties applied to evidence: why feature teams must never be the sole authors of their own audit records, and how a Kafka proxy, CDC and reconciliation fix it.
· 11 min read
Part 2/4 - Built naively, an audit trail becomes the largest and least erasable store of personal data you own. How privacy principles and minimal disclosure shape a trail that proves without exposing.
· 8 min read
Part 1/4 - Writing "the Earth is flat" in a server log proves nothing. What it takes to turn records into evidence: tamper-evidence, eIDAS 2 qualified timestamps and traced break-glass access.
· 12 min read
When a delegated purchase goes wrong, both sides have logs, and the logs disagree. Why TLS can't settle that, and what RFC 9421 message signatures can (and can't) do about it.
· 7 min read
Security never ends in an unconditional root of trust; it ends where the next layer stops paying for itself. For SSH keys on a Mac, three layers are enough, and one of them is already in your laptop.